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T HE 1951 amendments to the Defense Production Act of 1950 pro-
vided for separate wage control machinery to administer the federal
wage stabilization program for the airline industry.' General Order
No. 7 (Revised) of the Economic Stabilization Administrator 2 estab-
lished the Railroad and Airline Wage Board (RAWB), which carried
out this function from September 27, 1951, until the suspension of
direct wage controls by the President on February 6, 1953. 8 This article
will review and evaluate the effects of RAWB operations.
Airline employees were subject to the same wage and salary controls
that goyerned industry generally from January 25, 1951, the date of
imposition of the general wage freeze,4 until July 31, 1951, the expira-
tion date of the Defense Production Act of 1950. During this period
the stabilization of wages and salaries was under the jurisdiction of
the Wage Stabilization Board (WSB), or the Salary Stabilization Board
(SSB), depending upon whether the employees concerned were non-
exempt or exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the former
being under the WSB, and the latter the SSB.5 Neither the WSB or
the SSB during this period, however, developed any special policies to
accommodate the wage practices of the airlines. The WSB, on June 21,
1951, did establish a special interim Rail and Air Transport Appeals
and Review Committee, a tripartite panel, to process cases involving
employees subject to the Railway Labor Act, but it was only in existence
until July 31 of that year, and no special rules were developed for the
airlines. In April, 1951, there was established a Temporary Emergency
Railroad Wage Panel that was charged with making findings and recom-
mendations concerning a recently concluded wage agreement covering
165 STAT. 134, §105(a), (b) (1951); The Defense Production Act of 1950,
as amended §403 (a), §502.
2 Dated September 27, 1951.
8 Executive Order 10434 (February 6, 1953).
4 General Wage Stabilization Regulation 1 (January 26, 1951).
5 Section 13 (a) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act exempts from the mini-
mum wage and maximum hour requirements "any employee employed in a bona
fide executive, administrative, professional, or local retailing capacity, or in the
capacity of outside salesman (as such terms are defined and delimited by regula-
tions of the administrator) ." The requirements for exemption under this section of
the act are contained in regulations, part 541, issued by the Wage and Hour Ad-
ministrator (29 CFR, pt. 541).
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non-operating employees on the railroads,6 and in August, 1951, the
Panel was reactivated and entrusted with handling on an interim basis
(until establishment of the RAWB) wage stabilization cases in both
the railroad and air transport industries. 7 Even during this latter period,
however, the Panel, under the chairmanship of Dr. William M. Leiser-
son, operated on a case-by-case basis, and never adopted any general
principles for the handling of matters involving airline employees. The
task of developing policies for the regulation of airline wages was left
to the RAWB.
STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE RAWB
The RAWB was composed of three career civil servants with expert
knowledge of labor problems in the railroad and air transport in-
dustries. Only the chairman, Nelson M. Bortz, served on a full-time
basis. He was responsible for administration of the affairs of the Board,
and was the only member of the Board who participated in the day-to-
day processing of cases. It was possible for the internal organization and
operating techniques of the RAWB to be kept quite informal, because
of the compactness of the two industries subject to its jurisdiction, and
because of a very small staff.8 The RAWB's primary function was to
review applications for wage increases to determine whether they were
approvable under the standards set forth in the wage and salary regula-
tions. Throughout its existence the Board relied for the most part on
the standards contained in regulations promulgated by the WSB and
the SSB, it having been decided that this was desirable rather than for
it to draft its own regulations that might be at variance with those
applicable to industry generally.9 All RAWB orders approving wage
adjustments contained a certification required by Section 502 of the
Defense Production Act, that the approved adjustments were "con-
sistent with standards now in effect ... for the purpose of controlling
inflationary tendencies," and carried the countersignature of the Eco-
nomic Stabilization Administrator. A secondary function of the RAWB
was to review arbitration and emergency board decisions for the
Economic Stabilization Administrator.
6 General Order No. 7, issued by the Economic Stabilization Administrator
(April 9, 1951).
7 General Order No. 7, Amendment 1, issued by the Economic Stabilization
Administrator (August 17, 1951).8 Total number on the staff of the RAWB did not exceed twelve. The average
budget allocation was $75,000.
9 General Railroad and Airline Stabilization Regulation 1, originally issued
November 29, 1951, and revised May 23, 1952, simply adopted without change
appropriate regulations of the WSB and SSB. The line of demarcation between
RAWB and SSB jurisdiction was unclear, because the former had jurisdiction
over "employees subject to the jurisdiction of the Railway Labor Act." Under the
Railway Labor Act the term "employees" includes the lower echelon of supervisory
officials. These employees are exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act defini-
tion, but were subject to RAWB jurisdiction. See MacIntyre, The Railway Labor
Act-A Misfit for the Airlines, 19 J. Air L. & C. 274, 276 (1952). Therefore, where
these employees were not represented by unions, the RAWB applied standards
eontained in regulations of the SSB, the regulations of which differed slightly from
-those of the WSB. All other management officials remained subject to SSB juris-
diction throughout the stabilization period.
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The RAWB tried to give the airlineindustry "good service" by
expediting the processing of cases,' 0 having its staff always available
for consultation with management and union officials, and by attempt-
ing to educate the parties under its jurisdiction in understanding the
regulations and how they could be complied with. Every RAWB order
contained an explanation of the factors underlying the decision, in an
attempt to make its administrative actions understood. The RAWB's
mode of operation was made possible by the cooperative attitude of
the industry which was also reflected in the completely insignificant
incidence of noncompliance or violation of the regulations.
The basic standards used by the RAWB in processing airline peti-
tions, as reflected in the regulations that it administered, fell into three
general categories: (a) General wage increases did not require ap-
proval, if they did not exceed 10 percent above January, 1950 wage
levels,"i plus the percentage increase in the cost of living from January
15, 1951 to the date of the proposed increase; 12 (b) Those regulations
which permitted "housekeeping" or "day-to-day" compensation prac-
tices in effect on each airline prior to the wage freeze to continue in
effect without requiring approval of the controls agency (this included
increases based on merit or length of service, promotions, etc.) ;1s
(c) Those regulations which dealt with adjustment of wages and work-
ing conditions on one airline to conform more closely with wages and
working conditions in the airline industry as a whole, or in a particular
region.' 4
One of the most significant aspects of the RAWB's operations was
its development of methods for applying the standards set forth in these
regulations to ascertain unique wage practices of the airline industry.
Two. of the more important of these' wage practices which required
special standards were: (a) Relatively long automatic length-of-service
wage progression ranges for many groups of employees. (Under these
plans employees are hired at one rate, advance to a higher rate at the
end of six months, and continue to move up to higher rates at six-month
or one-year intervals, in some classifications not reaching the top of the
scale until after seven or eight years' service) ; (b) Complex methods of.
wage payment utilized for some members of flight crews. The problems
presented by this latter subject will be discussed subsequently in the
section entitled "Extension of the Flight Pay Formula."
10 The RAWB inherited a backlog of 321 cases of which 41 were airline cases.
During the period of its existence it processed 1402 cases of which 437 involved
airlines. RAILROAD AND AIRLINE WAGE BOARD, FINAL REPORT AND SUMMARY OP
ACTIVITIES 6 (March 31, 1953).
11 General Wage Regulation 6, as amended; General Salary Stabilization
Regulation 1 (amended), §22.
12 General Wage Regulation 8 (revised), as amended; General Salary Stabi-
lization Regulation 1 (amended), §41.
I8 General Wage Regulation 5 (revised), as amended; General Salary Stabi-
lization Regulation 1 (amended), Art. V, VI.
14 General Wage Regulation 10, as amended; General Salary Stabilization
Regulation 1, (amended), §43; General Wage Regulation 13 (revised), as amended;
General Salary Stabilization Regulation 1- (amended), §44, 91; General Wage
Regulation 17; General Salary Stabilization Regulation 1 (amended), §42.
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AUTOMATIC WAGE PROGRESSION PLANS
The primary problem confronting the RAWB was to apply the
cost-of-living and other appropriate yardsticks of the stabilization pro-
gram to wage increases that had been applied to automatic wage
progression schedules. Agreements for general wage increases took sev-
eral forms: (a) increases in equal amounts to all steps of the existing
rate range; (b) increases in unequal amounts to all steps of the existing
rate range; (c) increases to some but not all steps of the existing range;
(d) lengthening of the progression plan by the addition of steps to
the top of the existing range. Frequently the RAWB was called upon to
consider a combination of these forms.
The first of these types of adjustments, equal increases to all steps,
created no problem. The amount of such increases was easily computed
in. terms of the 10 percent and cost-of-living provisions of the regula-
tions, and could be put into effect by the parties without approval.
When progression schedules were adjusted unequally, or lengthened,
however, such as described in (b), (c), and (d) above, the exact
amount of the resulting wage increases was difficult to compute. Since
long progression ranges of this type are not commonly encountered in
other industries, the WSB had not delved very deeply into the matter,
and its rules tended to have an extremely arbitrary impact insofar as
the airlines were concerned. The WSB rule regarding application of
the so-called "10 percent formula" required that the amount of the
largest increase to any step in a rate range be offset against the permissi-
ble 10 percent.1 5 This rule assumed that every employee ultimately ob-
tained the largest increase received by any employee in the job classi-
fication, an unrealistic assumption in many instances. With respect to
the cost-of-living increases provided for by the regulations, the WSB
rule required that all increases be distributed in equal amounts or
percentages to all employees in the unit.10 This rule also had an
arbitrary effect on the automatic wage progression scales of the airlines.
The fourth type of increase frequently encountered by the RAWB,
lengthening of progression plans, also posed a problem. All such adjust-
ments had to be submitted to the RAWB, and were generally approved,
if not in excess of industry practice.1 7 If the proposed additional steps
went beyond industry practice, the RAWB was faced with the problem
of how the cost of such adjustments should be calculated, in order for
them to be properly offset against amounts legally permissible under
the 10 percent and cost-of-living formulas.
15 General Wage Regulation 6, as amended, Interpretation 40(IV) (d). This
was commonly referred to as the "total effect" rule.1 16 General Wage Regulation 8 (revised), as amended, Official Questions and
Answers Nos. 6, 27.
17 General Wage Regulation 5 (revised), as amended, §2(a) (vi) required
modifications of existing plans governing individual wage or salary increases to
be considered in the light of the employer's past practice and relevant practice
in the industry, occupation and/or area, as appropriate.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The second and third types of increases indicated above, and with
which the RAWB had to deal, obviously result in unequal increases for
different employees within a craft or'class. Lengthening of progression
schedules, the fourth type of increase frequently proposed during the
Korean emergency stabilization period, is also primarily a form of
unequal increase, for those employees at the top of the scale are the
ones primarily benefited. Proposals to lengthen progression schedules
coincide with increased average seniority of employees within a given
craft or class. If the RAWB had stuck to a policy of holding progression
schedules to existing lengths, it would have had an arbitrary effect on a
particular carrier, unless that carrier already had the longest wage
schedule for that craft and the actual wage increases resulting from
moving ahead of the industry were greater than those permitted by
the general-increase regulations of the WSB. In other words, interfer-
ence with this aspect of airline wage practices would be justified only
to prevent the possibility of particular rates advancing so far beyond
the prevailing rates as to create pressures for an upward movement of
the prevailing level of rates.
Unequal adjustments of airline wage progression schedules reflects
the instability of intraoccupational wage structures among various em-
ployee groups in the airline industry, as well as the evolution of inter-
occupational wage relationships. The self-administering regulations of
the WSB which permitted limited general increases assumed stable
wage structures. Therefore, the WSB regulations, when strictly inter-
preted, had the effect of prohibiting variations in the wage structure,
and imposed an arbitrary pattern upon an evolving and dynamic aspect
of airline wages. Confronted with petitions proposing one, or a com-
bination of the forms of general wage increases indicated above, the
RAWB had thrust upon it the problem of measuring the size of these
proposals with the appropriate standards contained in the regulations
of the WSB. In order to do this adequately, and in order not to disrupt
normal airline industry wage practices, the Board devised certain special
rules to meet the problems presented.
Without going into these rules in detail, suffice it to say that the
first goal of the Board was to find a workable method of computing
the actual inflationary effect of these normal airline wage practices.
There is no simple arithmetic rule for measuring such changes. Adjust-
ments of this type involve future, as well as immediate wage increases.
The amounts of future increases depend upon how employees are dis-
tributed at various steps of the wage schedule, and the rate of employee
turnover; these factors determining how many employees reach the
steps of the schedule being adjusted by the greatest amount. In general,
the objective of the RAWB was to endeavor to obtain an approximation
of the "immediate" and "total" wage increases that would result from
the proposed unequal increases, or addition of progression steps, from
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the proposed effective date of the first increase to the scheduled end
of wage controls (April 30, 1953).
The second goal of the Board was to minimize interference with
wage adjustment practices of a non-across-the-board nature, without
granting preferred treatment that would open loopholes and lead to a
general advance in the level of wages. Thus, for example, when a pro-
posed general wage increase was distributed unequally through the
steps of a rate range, and the "total effect" rule had an arbitrary effect,"'
the Board sought alternative measures. These measures varied, but
again there was taken into consideration the distribution of employees
in the rate range as compared to the location of the larger increases,
as well as the rate of turnover, in order to obtain an offset against the
permissible 10 percent which would be least arbitrary and best carry
out the intent of the regulation. By the same token, the Board did not
hold strictly to the WSB rule that required cost-of-living increases to
be on an across-the-board basis, but permitted variations where the
WSB rule would lead to arbitrary results.
At the same time that the RAWB was adapting the regulations to
airline wage practices, the WSB was adopting special rules in similar
situations to serve as "escape valves" for greater wage increases while
at the same time maintaining an appearance of conformity to official
ceilings. 19 The WSB approach for dealing with unequal wage adjust-
ments, however, would have resulted in special and arbitrarily favorable
treatment to those crafts and airlines adjusting wages on a varying as
compared to an across-the-board basis. The RAWB rules were more
restrictive on total increases, but gave greater equality of treatment
than the WSB's special rules.
Differences between WSB and RAWB policies with respect to ad-
ministering the wage regulations can be attributed to the relatively
favorable political and economic climate in which the RAWB operated,
and the fact that it had dealings with but two industries. Outside
pressures upon the RAWB were minimized by (a) the absence of a
dispute settlement function, and (b) the RAWB's policy of adopting
in toto regulations previously promulgated by the WSB. Complaints
against basic stabilization policy had to be directed at the WSB, the
agency that had established the policy.
Built-in characteristics of the economics of the air transport industry
generally operate to restrain the rate of advance of wages. Increases in
industry productivity, to a large extent, have been passed on to the
consumer in the form of lower fares and better service. Rapid tech-
nological progress has made the long-run economic position of the in-
dustry stronger, but the sizeable cost of modernizing and operating air
fleets has prevented any substantial improvement in the immediate
Is See note 15, ante.
19 Shortening of wage progression schedules in the telephone industry was
.approved by the WSB on the finding that no employees would receive future wage
mcreases as a result of such adjustment.
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short-run financial position of the airlines. The high proportion of
labor costs to total operating costs has also generally reduced the
ability of management to increase wages rapidly. These wage restrain-
ing influences have tended to counterbalance the increased bargaining
power of labor in the industry, and the upward pressures created by
shortages of certain types of skilled workers at a time when the industry
has been expanding its employment.
Airline wage adjustment practices have also created a pattern of
orderly and moderate wage increases. For example, during the period
of stabilization under consideration, the predominance of fixed-term
agreements, and the attention devoted to adding steps to progression
schedules and revising wage structures, tended to reduce the (a)
frequency, (b) scope, and (c) cost of general wage advances. Even
American Airlines' cost-of-living escalator provision including an an-
nual "improvement factor" that was contained in that carrier's three-
year agreement covering maintenance employees failed to have a
particularly widespread effect on wage level increases in the industry,
either with respect to their frequency or size. Perhaps it is significant
that the American escalator arrangement was one of the most conserva-
tive to be found in any industry during this period.20
The official wage regulations permitted the airline industry its
greatest leeway for effectuating wage increases at those points in the
total wage structure where increases tended to be the largest. For exam-
ple, general increases permissible under the regulations were calculated
on a percentage of average earnings as of a particular date for a craft
or class unit. Thus, highly skilled groups whose average earnings were
the highest were able to obtain greater cents-per-hour increases than
lesser skilled groups. Further, airlines that had given relatively small
general increases in 1950 could "catch up" to those carriers which had
given more substantial increases. In addition, airlines paying low rates
to certain groups of employees, for example, to clerical, and ticket and
reservations classifications, where there is a notable lack of wage uni-
formity in the industry, could obtain approval of larger adjustments
based on inter-carrier inequity than carriers paying higher rates to
these classifications. As a result of these characteristics of the regulations,
20 The American Airlines escalator clause contained several features which
acted as brakes retarding wage escalation. The first was the fact that adjustments
were based on an average of three monthly cost-of-living index figures. The use
of an average figure, rather than the most recent index such as used in most
escalator agreements, resulted in wage changes somewhat less than the actual
cost-of-living change when it was moving in a continuous upward or downward
trend. Secondly, the average cost-of-living change had to equal 2.35 index points
before a wage adjustment was effected. In the usual General Motors-type or rail-
road escalator provisions an index change of 1.14 or 1 point respectively would
result in a wage adjustment. Thirdly, the American Airlines agreement permitted
a maximum adjustment of only eight cents per hour up or down in any twelve-
month period. This "maximum" had the effect of preventing large wage adjust-
ments when prices were changing rapidly, and of postponing them until a period
when price level changes had become more moderate. Industry generally had no
similar "maximum" provision.
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throughout the stabilization period relatively few wage agreements
actually pierced the official ceilings. Undoubtedly, consistent admin-
istration by the RAWB also contributed to keep industry wages in line.
The Board was careful to veto increases to any group of employees in
any craft or 'class which actually exceeded the official ceilings. Such
wage advances were not frequent, although they occurred more often
in the last few months of 1952 and the first few weeks of 1953. By that
time, the cost-of-living index had ceased to rise, and the termination
of controls seemed probable in the near future.
EXTENSION OF THE PILOTS' FLIGHT PAY FORMULA
During the stabilization period the most significant changes in the
wage structure of the airline industry occurred among the flight crew
crafts as a result of the breakdown of the sharp-division in methods of
wage payment for copilots and flight engineers as compared to first
pilots.
Revision of the method of compensating copilots followed recom-
mendations of an emergency board (No. 94) appointed by the Presi-
dent in January, 1951, pursuantto the Railway Labor Act, -to consider
a dispute involving American Airlines and the Air Lines Pilots Asso-
ciation, AFL, (ALPA). Prior to this time copilots received a flat salary,
or base pay only, while captains earned base.pay and flight pay. 21 The
emergency board, reporting on May 25, 1951, recommended that co-
pilots, after the second year of service, should receive flight pay amount-
ing to 55 percent of that earned by the captain, and a corresponding
reduction in base pay to a level generally similar to the captain's. The
principle recommended, extension of the flight pay formula, was in-
corporated into all major agreements in the industry covering copilots
that were negotiated in the latter part of 195.1.
In 1952 the craft of flight engineers also demanded a flight pay
formula that was designed to restore its members to the position of
second highest paid member of the flight crew, a status taken over by
copilots as a result of the then newly negotiated agreements with the
ALPA. The demands of the flight engineers were considered by, an
arbitration board and three presidentially appointed emergency boards
followed by prolonged negotiations on the major carriers. As emergency
stabilization controls were being ended, the industry was converting
flight engineers to the pilots' flight pay formula.
Extension of the pilots' flight pay formula involved very definite
stabilization problems. So long as copilots and flight engineers remained
under a flat length-of-service salary progression schedule, their salaries
would not increase automatically as heavier and faster aircraft 'were
21 The pay formula for first pilots includes: base pay varying with length of
service; and flight pay consisting of - hourly pay varying according to the pegged
speed of the aircraft operated and whether flying is during the day or night;
gross weight pay of., specific cents per pound of the gross weight of the aircraft
per hour; and mileage pay based on the miles flown by a pilot during a month.:
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put into service. Nevertheless, as aircraft become heavier and more
complex the duties and responsibilities of copilots and flight engineers
increase just as do those of pilots. However, under the flight pay
formula, earnings of pilots would increase under these circumstances,
while the earnings of copilots and flight engineers who were on a flat
monthly salary would not. Thus, a wage inequity was developing among
flight crew members, the solution to which ultimately had to be con-
sidered in the light of wage stabilization policies.
In addition to revising the method of compensating copilots, agree-
ments negotiated in the summer and autumn of 1951 between the major
domestic air carriers and the ALPA provided for pay increases for first
pilots. The pay structure for captains had not been altered since 1947
and 1948, and although their earnings had increased, this was the result
of the operation of larger and faster air fleets, rather than any general
pay increases. When called upon to give its approval to the increases
negotiated for first pilots the RAWB was faced with the question of
how the flight pay components were to be considered in relation to
the wage ceilings. The regulations were conceived in terms of simple
time or piece rate methods of wage payment. Such rates could be
increased in line with the general increase formulas. However, the
,,wage rate" of pilots is the earnings resultant of various component
factors. Actual earnings are affected by a great number of matters in-
cluding changes in type of equipment, composition of pilot forces, and
airline policy with respect to the utilization of pilots.
The RAWB determined that the negotiated increases for captains
did not exceed wage ceilings.2 2 Applying the negotiated flight pay
formulas to the flight experience of a "normal" month in the second
half of 1951, the Board found that the average immediate increase in
captains' earnings varied on different airlines, primarily due to differ-
ences in the mileage pay factor that was included in the different agree-
ments. 2 Estimated increases averaged from 10 percent to 11.8 percent
under the "Eastern formula," and 13.6 percent under the "TWA
formula." 24 It was also noted that although the "Eastern formula" re-
22This action was taken under the base period abnormality provision of Gen-
eral Wage Regulation 6, as amended (§4), and the cost-of-living provision of
General Wage Regulation (revised), as amended. The most recent month for which
data were available was chosen as a substitute "base date" in lieu of January 15,
1950, the "normal" base pay period for measuring changes under the stabilization
program. This was deemed appropriate, because of the substantial changes in
flight equipment and composition of labor forces during the two or three years
preceding consideration of the pilot petitions (January-February, 1952).
28 The agreement concluded between Eastern Air Lines and the ALPA estab-
lished a pattern followed by several other carriers that provided for "step" in-
creases in mileage pay which varied the cents-per-mile rate according to the
number of miles flown during a month (10 per mile for each mile flown up to17,000, 20 for each mile flown between 17,000 and 22,000, and 30 for each mile
flown in excess of 22,000). TWA and a number of other carriers followed a course
of paying a flat or uniform mileage rate of 1%0 for each mile flown.
2 4 RAILROAD AND AIRLINE WAGE BoAmD, ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY (Typewrit-
ten) 66 (1953).
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suited in smaller immediate increases, it allows greater potential in-
creases than the "TWA formula" as aircraft speeds increase.
25
The RAWB's basic method of handling the pilot agreements was
to treat captains and copilots as two separate groups, since they both
involved the application of separate stabilization principles. As for
copilots, the American Airlines emergency board had found that the
pay differential between captains and copilots had been steadily widen-
ing, and that with the post-war introduction of faster and larger aircraft
the duties and responsibilities of copilots had increased measurably.
Accordingly, the emergency board had concluded that the copilots'
"work and position entitle them to the same type of incentive pay which
the first pilots have," and thus recommended that they be placed on a
pay plan which would "parallel that of the first pilots as closely as possi-
ble." The carriers and the ALPA, in their subsequent negotiations,
accepted the recommendations of the emergency board. In no instance,
however, did the negotiated flight pay formula go as high as 55 percent
of the captain's flight pay. In most contracts it was set at from 40 to 50
percent. The RAWB estimated that the average immediate increases
in copilot earnings ranged from 10 percent to 25 percent on most air-
lines." The Board found that the increases consisted of (a) general
increases tied to those received by captains; (b) increases resulting from
conversion from one system of payment to another; (c) an adjustment
to eliminate an inequity and maintain appropriate differentials between
captains and co-pilots; (d) in some cases individual re-evaluation of
the job where the original scales were set without adequate flight ex-
perience. Approval was granted by the RAWB, therefore, under appli-
cable stabilization regulations covering new or changed jobs and cor-
rection of intra-plant inequities.27
Correction of the captain-copilot inequity resulted in termination
of the status previously enjoyed by the third member of the cockpit
crew-the flight engineer. Prior to revision of the method of com-
pensating copilots, the flight engineer had been the second highest paid
member of the flight crew, second only to the captain. Under the 1951
pilot agreements the average earnings of copilots surpassed those pro-
vided for in agreements covering flight engineers. Consequently, in the
early months of 1952 the major airlines were presented with contract
proposals by representatives of the flight engineers requesting con-
version in method of compensation from a flat monthly salary to a
method like that of the pilots, involving both base pay and incentive-
type flight pay.
The flight engineer requests were first considered in an arbitration
between Eastern Air Lines and the Flight Engineers International As-
25 For a comprehensive discussion of the history and principles involved in
the 1951 pilot settlements, see Luther, The Development of the Mileage Limita-
tion Concept For the Airline Pilot, 20 J. Air L. & C. 1 (1953).2 6 RAILROAD AND AIRLINE WAGE BOARD, op. cit. supra, note 24, at 67.
27 General Wage Regulation 5 (revised), as amended, §6; General Wage Reg-
ulation 18.
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sociation, AFL. The award dated April 15, 1952, provided for a basis
of pay similar to that of captains and copilots, consisting of base. pay plus
flight pay increments. Although the arbitrator stated that the award
."maintains the historic differential in pay between flight engineers and
captains," it was far from satisfactory to the union which later chal-
lenged it in the courts on the ground, among others, that the recomn-
mended increase was less than amounts that would have been permitted
under the wage stabilization regulations. 2s It thus appeared that the
main issue in the dispute was the amount of general wage increase,
rather than the method of wage payment.
Subsequently, three emergency boards (Nos. 101, 102, and 103)
were appointed to recommend terms of settlement of similar disputes
between the flight engineers and Trans World Airlines, Northwest
Airlines, and United Air Lines respectively.21 The first two boards
recommended increases in flat monthly salaries of approximately 10
percent, the maximunm permissible for these employees under the wage
ceilings, but the flight engineers rejected the recommendations. After
subsequent negotiations, agreements were concluded on both TWA
and Northwest which provided for conversion to a flight pay formula
that entailed an immediate increase in earnings for the flight engineers
:of both carriers averaging approximately 10 percent,30 the same amount
recommended by the two emergency boards.
Emergency Board No. 103 was convened to make recommendations
in the dispute between United Airlines and the flight engineers in its
employ after there had been two strikes in the industry resulting from
rejection by the flight engineers of carrier offers based on the recently
concluded TWA agreement.31 The TWA settlement did not measure
up to the flight engineers' expectations of a general wage increase as
iarge as that which had been received by the copilots. On January 2,
1953, the United Airlines emergency board recommended conversion
to a flight pay formula designed to yield a level of earnings comparable
to that received by the flight engineers of TWA and Northwest under
their new agreements. The agreement that was subsequently concluded
on United, though resulting in a slightly larger increase than had been
recommended by the emergency board, incorporated the method of
wage payment consisting of base pay plus flight pay.32
28 Affidavit of Fact in Support of Petition of Flight Engineers International
Association, EAL Chapter, A.F.L. to Impeach Arbitration Award, In re Eastern
Airlines, Inc., Civil Action No. 4331-M (D.C., S.D. Fla. 1952).
29 The flight engineers employed by Northwest are represented for purposes
of collective bargaining by the International Association of Machinists, AFL. On
the other two carriers the Flight Engineers International Association represents
this craft of employees.
30 RAILROAD AND AIRLINE WAGE BOARD, op. cit. supra, note 24, at 68.
S1 Raskin, United's Big Planes Grounded by Strike, N.Y.Times, Nov. 6, 1952,
pp. 1,43; Ronan, Strike Halts Planes of Eastern Airlines, N.Y.Times, Dec. 2, 1952,
pp. 1,19.
32 The RAWB did not have an opportunity to act upon the United agree-
ment, due to the suspension of wage controls.
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As a result of the new method of wage payment established for
flight engineers in the industry, maximum earnings opportunities for
these employees increased substantially beyond the wage ceilings then
in effect. However, the RAWB concluded that the probable actual
increase in flight engineers' earnings as a result of the new formula
would not exceed on a normal utilization basis, the flat monthly salaries
clearly approvable under the appropriate regulations and recommended
by the emergency boards."
The history of the flight engineers' wage movement of 1952 indicates
that the RAWB probably could have done little to prevent extension
of the pilots' flight pay formula to this group of employees. The correc-
tion of inequities in the airline industry paralleled similar corrections
and improvements in employee status that were taking place in industry
generally during the Korean emergency period. Though such actions
have a definite inflationary bias, they were permissible under the gen-
erally flexible economic controls of the period.
EVALUATION
Certain general questions can be asked regarding the airlines' ex-
perience during this emergency stabilization period:
Would the industry have fared better, if it had remained
under the jurisdiction of the WSB, rather than being included
with railroads under a separate board?
Criteria for judging the most preferable type of wage control ma-
chinery for airline industry include: the degree Of restraint on wage
increases effectuated by wage ceilings; minimum disruption of normal
industrial relations and wage practices; efficiency and quality of controls
administration; effect of controls with respect to possible increases in
industrial strife; costs to the carriers of complying with burdensome
paper work, and possibly becoming involved in litigation resulting from
violations of the regulations; political conflicts created by controls
which impair relationships between carriers, the government, and the
public.
The major factor accounting for the airlines being placed under a
separate agency in time of emergency wage control is that they are not
subject to the general labor law of the land (Taft-Hartley Act), but
along with the railroads are subject to the Railway Labor Act. This
statute, entirely different in concept than the Taft-Hartley Act, places
primary emphasis on dispute settlement procedures, and provides a
legal framework quite different from that in which industry generally
operates.34 This fact, though not sufficient justification in itself for
33 The RAWB found that the average flight utilization of flight engineers by
the airlines whose cases were before it was typically 75 hours per month.
34 See Maclntyre, op. cit. supra, note 9; Frankel, Airline Labor Policy, The
Stepchild of the Railway Labor Act, 18 J. Air L. & C. 461 (1951).
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placing the railroads and. airlines under separate wage control- ma-
chinery, lends itself to various arguments that the railroad unions, the
railroads, and/or other interested parties, make from time to time in
favor of separate treatment for rail carriers. Assuming acceptance of
the view that the railroads benefit from separate stabilization ma-
chinery, the airlines are more or less carried along by sheer momentum,
since they are the only other industry subject to the Railway Labor Act.
When the fact that the airlines conduct their labor relations within a
legal framework different from that affecting the rest of industry, is
combined with the unique character of the wage structures in the
industry, strong argument can be made for separate stabilization treat-
ment for air carriers.
During the recent period of wage stabilization the RAWB pursued
a policy of conservative administration of the regulations. In fact, in
certain respects the RAWB ceilings were lower than the WSB ceilings.
Comparison of wage increases approved in the airline industry with
approved increases in transportation industries subject to WSB jurisdic-
tion bears this fact out, as does comparison of policies followed by the
two agencies in administering the regulations with similar wage struc-
tures (the airlines, and the telephone industry, for example). There
can be little question that conservative standards such as those main-
tained by the RAWB are beneficial to the general public in time of
inflation, and who would doubt that the airline industry itself achieves
short-run economic benefit from restraints thus being placed on general
wage increases?
Although a few airline unions may have been disadvantaged by
the stricter administration of wage controls, there was no serious crit-
icism of RAWB policies from union sources. By the same token, there
were no airline strikes as a result of RAWB action, although one union
did refuse to work overtime in an attempt to hasten, processing of a
pending case by the Board. 5 Relatively few negotiated increases failed
to receive Board approval, because the general advance in wages dur-
ing this period was, on the whole, moderate and orderly. Most of the
restraint fell upon the highest paid employees in a craft or class. The
concern of the RAWB that traditional wage adjustment practices be
permitted on a basis that treated all employees equally, prevented
union rivalries from becoming more serious. If the wage regulations
had been applied strictly, traditional airline wage practices would
have been disrupted, and serious inequalities of treatment might have
resulted.
Efficiency, as well as quality of administration of wage controls were
high, because there were only. two industries under RAWB jurisdic-
tion. Further, railroad stabilization policy having been almost com-
pletely developed prior to the summer of 1951 by the Temporary
Emergency Railroad Wage Panel (Leiserson Panel), the RAWB de-
85 RAILROAD AND AIRLINE WAGE BOARiD, op. cit. supra, note 24.
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voted most of its attention to the airlines. The WSB with so many
other industries, both substantially larger, and with more serious prob-
lems, would hardly have been able to give the detailed attention and
study to the airline industry that was given by the RAWB.
The RAWB consciously attempted to reduce the costs of direct
controls to carriers by minimizing the paperwork involved in sub-
mitting applications, preparing additional information, etc. The fair
and impartial manner of- the Board and its staff engendered an attitude
of cooperation on the part of a majority of the air transport industry.
The Board further encouraged this cooperative atmosphere by its
policy of holding periodic conferences during the stabilization period
with representatives of the industry; and separate conferences with
representatives of the unions active in the industry. In part, these
conferences were educational, but in part they were the Board's sub-
stitute for a formal enforcement program. The cooperation shown by
the industry and unions is indicated by the fact that there was almost
universal compliance with the regulations, and up to the termination
of controls, the RAWB had not initiated a single enforcement action
against an air carrier. The WSB, operating in an atmosphere of per-
petual crises and preoccupied with larger industries would not have
been able to give the service that was rendered by the RAWB. The
noncontroversial operation of the RAWB, and the freedom from
pressures that it enjoyed undoubtedly benefitted the air transport
industry, for airlines are dependent upon the goodwill of the govern-
ment as well as the public.
In view of the considerations indicated above, there would seem
to be little doubt that it was advantageous to the airlines to be under
the jurisdiction of the RAWB, rather than the WSB. It is also in-
dicated by the discussion above that regulations closely adapted to
the airline industry are justifiable, provided they are not based on
privileged treatment, but on good service.
Would the airlines have fared better if the wage stabilizers
recommended terms of settlement of disputes rather than con-
tinuing the only slightly modified peacetime procedures of the
Railway Labor Act for the settlement of disputes?
Although the WSB under the terms of the Defense Production
Act was.given a role in the settlement of labor-management disputes,
the wage control and dispute settlement functions were kept separate
for the railroad and airline industries, in an effort to continue the
peacetime dispute settlement machinery provided for by the Railway
Labor Act. The only link between dispute settlement and the control
machinery was the requirement that arbitration awards and emer-
gency board recommendations be certified as "consistent with such
standards as may then be in effect, established by or pursuant to law,
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for the purpose of controlling inflationary tendencies."36 The Economic
Stabilization Administrator had the power to set aside the findings of
arbitration or emergency boards, but it was never exercised.
The certification requirement performed two functions: (a) The
general wording of the Defense Production Act provision permitted
recommendation of increases slightly more or different than those
permitted by the regulations. Such recommendations are often needed
to resolve emergency disputes in cases where the cooperation of labor
is needed to continue defense production without interruption. How-
ever, by having separate ad hoc dispute settlement boards or panels,
such over-the-ceiling recommendations are less likely to set a prece-
dent than where dispute settlement and wage control are both vested
in the same governmental body. Thus, the certification device is use-
ful -in settling disputes without generally lifting wage ceilings. (b)
Under the Defense Production Act the deviation of recommendations
from wage ceilings had to be relatively small, because the certification
implied that a recommendation of an over-the-ceiling adjustment
would not serve as the basis for a general abandonment of wage ceil-
ings. That is, it had to be certified as "consistent with ... standards ...
then in effect ... for the purpose of controlling inflationary tenden-
cies."
On the basis of the above discussion it would seem that there are
definite advantages to the separation of dispute settlement and wage
control machinery when carried out along the lines utilized for the
railroads and airlines in the Korean emergency period. One of the
factors to be kept in mind when considering the matter, however, is
that the desirability of this technique is dependent upon the con-
tinuation of the Railway Labor Act. Two recent articles in this journal
have contended that continued application of the act to the airline
industry is undesirable.37 Both articles place particular stress on alleged
deficiencies in the emergency board system, the last step in the dispute
settlement procedure provided for in the act. The conclusion reached
in these articles is debatable. As far as the airlines are concerned, the
experience with emergency boards has not been entirely unfavorable.
Emergency boards established in both the pilots' and flight engineers'
disputes discussed previously were "successful," in that following the
emergency board recommendations, agreements were concluded with-
out serious strikes or serious disruptions of wage relationships. It must
be kept in mind -with respect to emergency boards that their recom-
mendations need not be incorporated without change in subsequently
concluded agreements for them to have succeeded. The emergency
board creates the framework and basis for resolving serious disputes;
it is not an instrument for compulsory arbitration.
•30 The Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, §502.
9 MacIntyre, op. cit. supra, note 9; Frankel, op. cit. supra, note 34.
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Is a tripartite stabilization agency preferable for the air-
line industry, rather than an all-public body such as the
RA WB?
There is much merit to the view that during emergencies, if gotv-
ernment is able to-command the required cooperation from labor and
management, all-public wage stabilization agencies are preferable to
tripartite agencies, because their role and responsibilities for helping
in the success of the stabilization program are clearer. The record of
tripartite boards is subject to criticism, because of their tendency to
administer on the basis of expediency and compromise. Tripartism is
unwieldy in the area of development and modification of wage policy,
as well as in the administration and enforcement of such policy. The
tendency for tripartite boards to break up because of conflicts of in-
terest between labor and management members also contributes to
the weakness of this technique. There is justification for the tripartite
mode of procedure, however, when the absolute cooperation of both
labor and management is needed in time of national emergency, and
to give them a voice in the formation and administration of policy
is the best way of securing it.
In any event, the successful administering of wage controls by the
all-public RAWB points to the advantage of this technique, at least
under comparable circumstances. The administration of controls by
a tripartite board for employees subject to the Railway Labor Act
would be very difficult in practice. Both of the industries covered by
the act, railroads and airlines, would seek equal representation on such
a board. There are great differences between carriers within the re-
spective industries, particularly in terms of size, geographical area
served, number of employees, etc. Some sort of fair representation
would have to be given. Similar problems exist with respect to unions
in the two industries. Not only would employees of both industries
want to be represented, but there are also AFL, CIO, and independent
unions representing many different crafts, with just as many interests
at stake. A tripartite board would be altogether unwieldy in'size under
these circumstances.
Public policy with respect to labor relations in these two industries,
as witnessed by the Railway Labor Act, points to impartial or public
administration.38 Certainly, an all-public board is not subject to as
much pressure as a tripartite body to make decisions based on the
relative size and economic strength of various companies and unions
subject to its jurisdiction. As mentioned above, during the period of
its existence the RAWB held a number of policy conferences with
representatives of industry and labor, purposely seeking out their
88 For another discussion of governments' role in the airlines' industrial re-
lations picture, see Kahn, The National Airlines Strike: A Case Study, 19 J. Air
L. & C. 11 (1952).
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views. In a sense, this was a substitute for tripartism. Finally it should
be noted that both the airlines and railroads are accustomed to con-
trols administered by civil servants, and have not insisted upon tri-
partism in the administration of wage controls.
What guides for future stabilization programs can be de-
rived from the RA WB experience?
The RAWB received relatively little criticism from either man-
agement or labor sources during the period of its operation. This is to
its credit, and to the credit of its staff. In general, the administration
of wage controls by the Board would appear to have been successful.
However, the success of any such board that might be established in
another period of emergency depends upon the extent to which eco-
nomic and political factors are as favorable as they were during the
period in which the RAWB was in existence. Wage controls are cer-
tainly undesirable, except when absolutely necessary. They are justi-
fiable restrictions on the freedom to determine wages only in periods
of grave emergency characterized by serious inflationary pressures that
cannot otherwise be checked. As soon as the inflationary danger has
subsided to the point where stability can be achieved by other means,
direct controls should be removed.
